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The Use of Adverse Publicity to
Regulate Campaign Speech
"The purflcation of politics is an iridescent dream,"
John James Ingalls'
The regulation of election campaigns has undergone rapid growth
during the past decade. Since 1972, 40 states have enacted new laws
regulating campaign financing.' The amount of money that an individ-
ual can contribute to campaigns is presently limited in 23 states.
3
Forty-nine states now require disclosure reports relating to campaign
contributions and expenditures. Independent commissions enforce
these regulations in more than half of the states.'
Campaign finance regulations deal with only one aspect of the politi-
cal selection process. A second and equally persistent problem is the
use of deceptive and misleading campaign appeals. In 1974, a survey
of state election laws indicated that only 17 states had enacted statutes
concerning false and misleading campaign speech. While California
statutes do not ban false appeals generally, state law does prohibit false
claims of party endorsement or support,7 false claims of incumbency,8
and misleading or unauthorized fund raising appeals.9
One reason for the relative lack of legislation in this area is the strin-
gent first amendment protection traditionally afforded political
speech. 10 Regulations affecting campaign speech are likely to receive
the strictest scrutiny. 1 Such regulations will be tested not only by their
application to the parties before the court but by their potential appli-
1. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 748 (14th ed. 1968).
2. COMMON CAUSE, CAMPAION REFORM IN THE STATES 10 (January, 1979) [copy on file at
Pacgc Law Journal].
3. Id. at 11. The twenty-three states are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming.
4. Id. at 10-11. Only North Dakota does not require any disclosure reporting.
5. Id. at 11.
6. Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1273 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Election Law Developments].
7. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §11707.
8. See id §29450.
9. See id. §§12301, 12302, 12303.
10. See generally Election Law Developments, supra note 6, at 1272-86.
11. Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971).
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cation as well. 2 Furthermore, cases discussing sanctions applicable to
public debate indicate that the New York Times v. Sullivan 13 standard
may be a prerequisite to regulation in many instances.14
A recent enactment by the Orange County Board of Supervisors
brings into focus the problems involved in promoting truth and accu-
racy in campaign communications. This measure, the Orange County
Fair Campaign Practices Ordinance,'" establishes a five-member com-
mission" empowered to conduct hearings and issue determinations as
to whether local campaign literature or broadcasts contain false or mis-
leading statements.' 7 All candidates are required to submit copies of
literature and broadcasts at the time of distribution,'8 and the Commis-
sion is free to conduct hearings by request or upon its own initiative.' 9
But the sole sanction available in cases of false or misleading advertis-
ing is the adverse publicity generated by an unfavorable Commission
finding.
This unique approach to the regulation of false campaign speech
merits careful consideration for several reasons. By relying on adverse
publicity to discourage false and misleading statements, the ordinance
raises the question of whether a relatively indirect sanction, such as an
unfavorable press release, can be an impermissible deterrent to free dis-
cussion. Through the establishment of the Commission, the ordinance
provides for an administrative body with the novel role of adjudicating
the veracity of campaign statements. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the early operation of the ordinance has indicated that the Or-
ange County approach can be an effective and workable deterrent to
false and misleading campaign advertising.20 In short, the ordinance
12. When first amendment interests are at stake, a regulation will be subjected to the over-
breadth doctrine. Under this doctrine the courts may invalidate a statute that primarily regulates
unprotected expression if the statute reaches protected expression in the process. Although the
statute may not be invalid as applied to the parties before the court, the doctrine allows a party to
challenge the statute on the basis that it may be susceptible of application to protected expression
under circumstances not before the court. Thus, the statute may be invalidated on its face based
entirely upon an analysis of its language and potential application. See generally Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. The New York Times malice standard prohibits a public official or public figure from
recovering damages for defamatory statements concerning his conduct absent a showing that the
statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1964); Election Law Developments, supra note 6, at 1275-83. For cases
extending the malice standard beyond ordinary defamation actions, see generally Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
15. ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., COUNTY ELECTION REGULATIONS, (Feb. 6, 1979) [copy on file
at Pacfic Law Journal].
16. Id. art. 3, §1-7-30.
17. Id. art. 3, §1-7-42(b), (e).
18. Id. art. 2, §1-7-23 (ordinance no. 3131, enacted June 1, 1979).
19. Id. art. 2, §1-7-42(b).
20. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
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institutes an innovative, effective, and arguably constitutional scheme
to alleviate a problem that long has plagued democratic government.
Whether the ordinance actually can withstand the dictates of the first
amendment is the focus of this comment.
To answer this question the comment will analyze the key first
amendment problems surrounding the regulation of false speech in a
political context. This analysis will show that adverse publicity issued
prior to election day can be a powerful deterrent to the free exchange of
information in the campaign process and that this deterrent is sufficient
to invalidate the Orange County ordinance under the first and four-
teenth amendments. The major part of the comment will address the
campaign falsity provisions of the ordinance. To the extent necessary
to examine the measure thoroughly, the comment also will discuss pro-
visions in the ordinance limiting the distribution of anonymous litera-
ture and the use of third party endorsements. Because of the unique
character of the ordinance, a more detailed analysis of its provisions
and operation is an appropriate starting point.
THE ORANGE COUNTY FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES ORDINANCE
The Orange County Fair Campaign Practices Ordinance was
adopted in early 1978 by the Orange County Board of Supervisors in
response to a series of scandals which saw the indictment of 43 Orange
County political figures. 21 It is the only enactment of its kind in Cali-
fornia.
The scope of the ordinance is limited to campaigns for county offices
and county ballot measures.23 Focusing on campaign broadcasts and
literature prepared for mass distribution, the ordinance regulates de-
ceptive communications in several ways. Persons using another per-
son's name in support of or in opposition to a candidate or ballot
measure must obtain written permission from that person prior to using
his or her name.24 A broadcast which "aids in the defeat of any candi-
date" 25 must indicate whether or not the contents have been authorized
by any candidate.26 All literature and broadcasts must clearly bear the
name of at least one person who is responsible for its distribution.
27
Finally, copies of all broadcasts and literature intended for mass distri-
bution must be filed with the Registrar of Voters no later than three
21. L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1979, §2, at 8, col. 2.
22. Id.
23. ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., COUNTY ELECTION REGULATIONS, art. 1, §1-7-5 (1979).
24. Id. art. 2, §1-7-20.
25. Id. art. 2, §1-7-21.
26. Id.
27. Id. art 2, §1-7-22.
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hours after the initial distribution is begun.2"
To implement these requirements, the ordinance creates the Orange
County Fair Campaign Practices Commission. 9 The Commission is
composed of five members.30 Each member of the Board of Supervi-
sors may nominate a person to fill one of the seats and appointment is
made by a majority vote of the Board.31
The Commission does not have broad enforcement powers. It is au-
thorized to examine reports of candidate contributions and expendi-
tures for the purpose of determining compliance with state and county
law.32 The Commission is also responsible for monitoring compliance
with the Fair Campaign Practices Ordinance3 3 and, upon a determina-
tion of probable cause, the Commission may conduct hearings to deter-
mine whether a violation has occurred.34 If the Commission does
determine that a violation has taken place, it must report this finding to
the District Attorney for enforcement. 3 A conviction for violating the
ordinance may result in a fine of up to $1000 or a maximum of six
months in the county jail, or both.
36
The primary function of the Commission, however, has nothing to
do with criminal sanctions. The ordinance provides that it is the duty
of the Commission to "[e]xamine all pieces of campaign literature and
copies of paid political advertisements intended for broadcast" 37 to de-
termine if there is reasonable cause to believe that they contain "false
or misleading statements. 38 Upon a finding of reasonable cause the
Commission may conduct hearings, 39 and upon reaching a determina-
tion may "take such steps as it deems appropriate to inform the public
of its findings with respect to such statements." 4° Presumably, this ac-
tion would primarily consist of issuing press releases.
The Commission's authority to review campaign communications
does not extend to the personal comments and speeches of candidates,
insofar as they are not incorporated in literature or broadcasts.4'
"Campaign literature" is defined as "any matter which is distributed to
28. Id. art. 2, §1-7-23.
29. Id. art. 3, §1-7-30.
30. Id. art. 3, §1-7-13.
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 3, §1-7-41.
33. Id.
34. Id. art. 3, §1-7-42.
35. Id.
36. Id. art. 4, §1-7-50.
37. Id. art. 3, §1-7-41.
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 3, §1-7-42.
40. Id.
41. See id. art. 1, §1-7-5; art. 3, §1-7-41.
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persons by whatever means for the purpose of influencing the action of
voters for or against" a publicly announced candidate for county office
or "the passage or defeat of any measure which has qualified for the
ballot."' 2 Only literature distributed in quantities of 500 or more is
subject to the review.43 Also subject to review are paid political broad-
casts prepared for radio or television."
The ordinance apparently has had a significant impact on the Or-
ange County election process. Initial passage of the ordinance occurred
in time to allow the Commission to monitor the 1978 election for four
county offices. The Commission's effect on that election was assessed
in a report prepared at the direction of the Board of Supervisors by the
Orange County Citizens Direction Finding Commission.4
The report indicated that the Fair Campaign Practices Commission
had not acted on its own initiative in identifying deceptive advertising
but had responded to a number of complaints by other candidates.
4 6
During both the primary and general elections, the Commission heard
a total of 21 complaints regarding the veracity of campaign ads.47 In
seven of those cases, the Commission issued determinations that the
communications contained false or misleading statements. 48 The sig-
nificance of these actions, however, was small in comparison to evi-
dence of the Commission's deterrent effect.49
According to the report, polls conducted by campaign consultants
indicated that "an unusually large number of voters would vote against
a candidate who was adjudged as having violated fair campaign prac-
tices."50 Press coverage of Commission actions was "substantial"5 and
adverse findings against candidates were assured of "widespread expo-
sure."'52 Candidates made effective use of Commission rulings includ-
ing reprinting adverse findings in campaign ads.53 One consultant even
went so far as to say that all advertising was prepared "with an eye to
how the Commission would view it ' 54 and that the Commission "cle-
42. Id. art. 1, §1-7-5 (campaign literature does not include bumper stickers, windshield stick-
ers, or official ballots).
43. Id. art. 1, §1-7-5, art. 2, §1-7-23.
44. 1d.
45. ORANGE COUNTY CITIZENS' DIRECTION FINDING COMMISSION, THE ORANGE COUNTY
FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES CoMuIssIoN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (March 27, 1979)
[copy on fie at Pactifc Law Journal].
46. Id. at 1.
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aned up our act.""5 A number of the consultants interviewed were of
the opinion that an adverse ruling by the Commission could determine
the outcome in a close race. 6
The findings of the report should be viewed with some caution since
the report was written in a highly conclusionary form and did not doc-
ument its findings with quantitative support.' But the report confirms
what common sense suggests: the fear of pre-election adverse publicity
will deter deceptive campaign speech. But measures which deter false
speech in the political arena may also discourage speech protected by
the first amendment. Whether this chilling effect is permissible under
the Constitution depends on an analysis of the competing interests af-
fected by the regulation.
FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Permissible Limits of Regulation
The starting point in determining first amendment limitations on the
regulation of campaign speech is the traditional protection afforded to
speech relating to our governmental processes.5 8 Governmental actions
which restrict the expression of views concerning public issues are in-
herently suspect, especially when the election process is affected. 9 As
the United States Supreme Court stated in Monitor Patriot v. Roy, the
first amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application" in speech
by candidates for public office.6°
The courts have been equally clear, however, in stating that "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact."' 61 Deceptive and
misleading statements belong to "the category of utterances which are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas."62 Nevertheless, the inter-
est in a vigorous public debate may require the protection of some
falsehood "in order to protect speech that matters. '' 63 In a case af-
firming the government's interest in regulating deceptive commercial
advertising, it was emphasized that where speech contains ideas it may
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally id.
58. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,413-14 (1974); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1937).
59. See First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
60. Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971).
61. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
62. Id; see, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
63. 418 U.S. at 341.
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be protected "even if it contains inaccurate assertions of fact."'
How much falsity must be tolerated in the campaign context is un-
clear. The primary danger posed by this kind of regulation is that in
the process of discouraging deceptive expression, protected expression
may also be deterred. In this sense the problem of false campaign com-
munications raises issues closely related to those involved in defama-
tion actions against public figures.
In New York Times v. Sullivan6" the Court stated that the interest in
an unrestrained discussion of public issues requires the protection of
negligent defamation directed at public officials.66 Where a defamation
action against a public official is not based on a finding that the state-
ment was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not,"'67 the action would "dampen the
vigor and limit the variety of public debate.
68
The New York Times standard has not been extended to all instances
where false speech is regulated in a public context. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 69 the Court refused to extend the malice standard to an
action against a news outlet that published defamatory statements
against a person who was neither a public official nor a public figure.70
In deciding that a private individual could bring an action based on
false statements negligently made, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of the balancing process in determining what standard is re-
quired. Stating that the New York Times case represents an
accomodation between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited public
press and the "limited state interest present in the context of libel ac-
tions brought by public persons,"7" the Court went on to conclude that
the greater interest in affording redress to private citizens outweighed
the need for press protection in this instance.7"
This balancing process has been traditionally employed where other-
wise legitimate regulations have an inhibiting impact on free expres-
sion.73 In such instances the regulatory scheme may be constitutionally
justified where the regulation advances sufficiently compelling state in-
64. Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
780 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. Id. at 279-80.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 279.
69. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
70. Id. at 343-44.
71. Id. at 343.
72. Id. at 345-46.
73. See generally, eg., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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terests. 74 The first consideration is, of course, the degree to which the
regulations may deter or discourage protected speech.7" This impact,
the "chilling effect," raises the first amendment problem but is by no
means dispositive. When an important public interest is advanced by
the regulation, the chilling effect may be constitutionally supported.
Regulations chilling free expression have been justified by a variety of
state interests including the interest in an informed electorate,76 the in-
terest in protecting private reputation," and the interest in deterring
government corruption.78
While closely related to the interests considered in New York Times
and Gertz, the considerations involved in evaluating campaign speech
regulation raise slightly different issues. Traditional first amendment
concerns for protecting a vigorous discussion of public matters have a
more urgent meaning in the campaign context.7 9 But the interests ad-
vanced also appear more compelling. Campaign falsity regulations
seek to protect the election process by encouraging accurate informa-
tion upon which the voters may base their choices.8 0 To the extent that
the electorate is misinformed, the quality of the selection process and
the government itself stand to suffer. Thus it can be argued that the
interest in an informed electorate is significantly greater than the state
interest in protecting private citizens from defamation-related injury.
Furthermore, to the extent that regulations effectively limit false cam-
paign appeals they encourage public confidence in the election process.
The determination of what standard will limit the application of
publicity sanctions to false campaign speech will depend upon a bal-
ancing of the state's interest in accurate information in the election
process against the chilling effect on legitimate speech created by such
sanctions. The balancing process, in this instance, is particularly deli-
cate because on both sides of the scale the interests advanced promote a
better informed public and encourage a political environment that will
facilitate a search for truth. How this problem is resolved should de-
pend in large part upon how effectively the new regulations enhance
the truth-seeking process.
74. See note 72 supra.
75. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
TRIBE].
76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
77. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-57 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
78. 424 U.S. at 67-68.
79. See note I l supra.
80. See Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446,452,458,393 P.2d 428,431,435,39 Cal. Rptr.
228, 231, 235 (1964); Election Law Developments, supra note 6, at 1278-79.
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B. Vanasco v. Schwartz: The Limits Applied
The regulation of campaign speech has received little attention in the
courts. The United States Supreme Court has never directly discussed
the problem of state proscriptions on deceptive campaign speech. Per-
haps the only federal case which directly discusses the standard appli-
cable to sanctions on false campaign speech is Vanasco v. Schwartz,
81
in which a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York invalidated several provisions of the
New York Fair Campaign Code.
The New York Fair Campaign Code was enacted for the purpose of
"stimulating just debate" in election campaigns." Under the Code
candidates were prohibited from making various misrepresentations
during the course of their campaigns. A candidate was prohibited from
misrepresenting party endorsement,83 candidate qualifications,84 or
candidate positions on the issues.85 Other provisions of the Code at-
tempted to regulate the subject matter of campaign appeals.86
Enforcement of the Code rested with the State Board of Elections.
The Board could hear complaints, issue determinations, impose fines,
and initiate judicial proceedings to enforce its orders.87 Orders could
require correction of communications in violation of the Code.88
The three-judge panel, in a decision affirmed without opinion by the
United States Supreme Court,89 held that the Code was in violation of
the first amendment because misrepresentation provisions did not in-
corporate the New York Times malice standard.9" In finding that the
Code creates a substantial chill on speech protected under the first
amendment, the opinion emphasized that, even apart from the author-
ity to impose fines, "any adverse finding by the Board. . . will be high-
ly publicized by the respondent's opponent."'" Considering this
prospect and the possibility of fines or imprisonment, "it is not difficult
to see how a political candidate might be deterred from making pro-
tected statements when he must consider the consequences of a Board
81. 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
82. 9 N.Y. CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS, §6201.1, citedin Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F.
Supp. at 101. These regulations have been extensively rewritten since the Vanasco decision.
83. Id. §6201.1(0. This provision was eliminated subsequent to the Vanasco decision.
84. Id. §6201.1(d). This provision was eliminated subsequent to the Vanasco decision.
85. Id. §6201.1(e). This provision was eliminated subsequent to the Vanasco decision.
86. In addition to regulating campaign misrepresentations, the Code proscribed attacks on
race, sex, religion, or ethnic background of a candidate. See id. §6201.1(c). This provision was
eliminated subsequent to the Vanasco decision.
87. N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§469, 472 (McKinney 1974).
88. Id.
89. Schwartz v. Vanasco, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
90. Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 94-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
91. Id. at 98.
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proceeding."92
Vanasco makes clear that any statute imposing monetary sanctions
on deceptive campaign speech must be premised upon a finding of ac-
tual malice under the New York Times standard. However, the opinion
leaves unanswered questions surrounding the use of adverse publicity
to discourage false campaign appeals. This problem is confronted di-
rectly in the Orange County Fair Campaign Practices Ordinance.
PROBLEMS WITH THE ORANGE COUNTY FAIR CAMPAIGN PRACTICES
ORDINANCE
A. Extent of Sanctions
The fundamental problem raised by the Orange County ordinance is
whether or not the use of adverse publicity to deter deceptive campaign
speech requires the application of the malice standard. This determi-
nation will require the use of the balancing approach similar to that
employed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 93 There the Court sought to
balance the interest in protecting private reputation against the interest
of the press in immunity from liability.94 In the present case the courts
will first look to the impact of the regulation in deterring or chilling a
free and vigorous election debate.95 This impact will then be weighed
against the state interests in facilitating voter access to accurate infor-
mation and in promoting confidence in the election process.
The essential difference between the Orange County regulations and
those employed under the New York Code lies in the sanctions im-
posed. In eschewing fines, imprisonment, and injunctive relief, the Or-
ange County approach seeks to regulate through information issued in
the form of Commission determinations. But this information is in it-
self a sanction. A candidate publicly branded for distributing false or
misleading literature may have his election prospects seriously dam-
aged.96 In jeopardizing election victory, the decisions of the Commis-
sion may silence a candidate much more quickly than the fear of more
conventional remedies.
When monetary sanctions or damages have been sought based upon
false statements regarding public officials, the courts consistently have
held that non-malicious false statements must be protected to preserve
the vigor of public debate.97 If this same standard is applied to public-
92. Id.
93. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
94. Id. at 339-45.
95. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
96. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 14 supra.
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ity sanctions created by the Orange County ordinance, the ordinance
would be unconstitutional for failure to limit its determinations to cases
of malicious falsity.
There would appear to be little basis for distinguishing publicity
sanctions under the Orange County ordinance from fines and damages
invalidated in other instances. There is very good reason to believe
that the ordinance creates a powerful deterrent against the use of state-
ments that the speaker knows could prove false or misleading. As indi-
cated in the report of the Citizens Direction Finding Commission,
candidate polling showed that an adverse determination from the Fair
Campaign Practices Commission would affect the decisions of a large
percentage of the voters.98 Candidates made use of Commission deter-
minations, even to the point of reprinting them in their own advertis-
ing.99 Consultant interviews indicated that the existence of the
Commission affected campaign decisions"° and that the Commission
could determine the outcome in a close race.'01
These findings are not surprising. While the point can be argued that
the Commission determinations are merely corrective in nature, this
argument overlooks the inflated impact that these determinations are
likely to have in the election context. In an era when much of the can-
didate exchange is viewed with significant voter skepticism, the effect of
an "official" determination is likely to be strong. Because no other for-
mal fact-finding processes are available to assist the voter, the electo-
rate may exaggerate the importance of these determinations. Delicate
distinctions concerning what is or is not misleading may be perceived
by the votor as adjudications of truth. Considering the echo effect of
candidates using Commission rulings for their own purposes, 0 2 it is
hard to argue that the ordinance could not be effectively exploited for
partisan ends.
The important point about the ordinance is that its most potent chill
is the prospect of election defeat. While monetary damages or fines
may hurt a candidate, the adverse publicity of a Commission determi-
nation may cost him the election. 10 3 Commission determinations re-
flect directly on the reputation of the candidate for honesty, and voter
feelings about a candidate's character and integrity may be as impor-
tant as any particular stand on policy-related issues. Vanasco, perhaps
recognizing this point, refers to the impact of adverse publicity as a
98. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
99. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
100. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
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factor in requiring the employment of the malice standard in the New
York Code.' °4
If monetary damages for negligent misrepresentation offer a chill
likely to reach protected expression, certainly the threat of election de-
feat reaches further. Campaign deficits are a common feature of poli-
tics' 0 5 and the candidate's personal financial investment may be high
even when contributions are plentiful.10 6 Against the accelerating costs
of modem campaigning the thousand-dollar fine invalidated in Va-
nasco appears small in significance. In deciding whether or not the
malice standard is applicable to publicity sanctions applied in Orange
County, it is important to .remember that the state interests in voter
information and confidence in the election process are distinguishable
and probably stronger than the interest in protecting personal reputa-
tion advanced in Gertz and New York Times. But on the chill side of
the equation it is difficult to contend that the risk of a post-election fine
will stifle candidate discussion to a greater degree than the prospect of a
potential election defeat.
Before concluding this discussion of the chill raised by the ordinance,
it is important to note that the ordinance does not address all campaign
speech. In limiting Commission review to literature and broadcasts
prepared by the candidates, the ordinance excludes most extemporane-
ous campaign speech. Live broadcasts would, of course, be subject to
Commission review. But most campaign advertising is prepared
through a deliberative process during which the content of all state-
ments is subjected to the review of the candidate, the candidate's advi-
sors and, often, the candidate's advertising agency. Usually, this
process should allow time for research and investigation. The risk of
negligent misrepresentation is diminished' 0 7 and the deterrent effect of
the ordinance touches a more limited category of appeals. When an
important issue requires discussion, a candidate need not refrain from
making statements in public appearances that are not incorporated into
literature or paid broadcasts.
No doubt campaign advertising is still a broad category and certainly
situations will arise late in the campaign in which the need for an im-
mediate response may result in particularly undeliberative advertising.
But the ordinance's limitation does lessen the character of its intrusion
104. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
105. See generally Bus. WEEK, March 17, 1980, at 37-38; NAT'L J., May 15, 1976, at 650-55;
UNITED STATES NEWS & WORLD REP., October 23, 1978, at 112.
106. See generally CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., May 20, 1978, at 1244-48.
107. But see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (malice standard applied to
action based on alleged defamation in a newspaper advertisement).
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on free expression and for this reason its reach is important to note.10 8
In New York Times and Vanasco the prospect of fines and damages
was sufficient to invalidate regulations reaching non-malicious speech.
If the chill created by the ordinance is equal to that created by mone-
tary sanctions, then the ordinance must fail unless the state interests
advanced are sufficient to justify the chill.
B. The State Interests
There is no question that the ordinance advances important state in-
terests. Previous cases relating to the defamation of public officials
have referred to the interest in protecting personal reputation. 0 9 The
ordinance no doubt advances this interest. But in reaching beyond per-
sonal defamation to include all false or misleading statements con-
tained in campaign advertising, the regulation touches broader
interests. By furnishing information regarding the veracity of cam-
paign statements, the ordinance seeks to protect our process of selecting
leaders.a'0 If the voter must rely on inaccurate information, the quality
of his decisions will suffer. The state, therefore, has an important inter-
est in facilitating the voter's access to accurate information that may be
relevant to his choice of candidates."' In the sense that this interest
has an impact on the decisions of the electorate, it goes to the core of
our self-government process. To the extent that candidate communica-
tions avoid false or misleading statements, voter confidence in the proc-
ess is likely to result. Thus, the state interest in accurate voter
information would appear much stronger than the interest in individ-
ual reputation." 12
The determination of truth in the political arena has traditionally
been achieved through the free exchange of competing viewpoints in
the marketplace of ideas.' '3 Regarding statements similar to those ad-
dressed in the ordinance, the United States Supreme Court has said
that "counter-argument and education are the weapons available to ex-
pose these matters.""' 4 But in the context of an election campaign the
voter may not be able to wait for counter-argument to expose the falsity
of a matter upon which he may base his vote. In the latter stages of a
108. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 77 supra.
110. See note 80 supra.
11. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976), Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446,
458, 393 P.2d 428, 435, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 235 (1964). See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 762-63 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
112. Election Law Developments, supra note 6, at 1279.
113. See, g., Wood v. Georgia, 310 U.S. 375, 389 (1962); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally TRIEu, supra note 75, § 12-8.
114. 370 U.S. at 389.
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campaign there may be inadequate time for effective reponse. 15 By
providing some method of official adjudication, the state can at least
provide some assistance to the candidate when there is still time for
hearing and determination. In this sense, the time constraints inherent
in the election process support the state interest in facilitating determi-
nations of truth.
The state interest in promoting an informed electorate is no doubt a
compelling consideration. But any measure which advances this inter-
est at the expense of a robust public discussion may be defeating the
very end it seeks to advance. Whatever secondary measures we may
adopt to facilitate the quest for truth, the primary means by which the
American system advances this process is through the unrestrained ex-
change of viewpoints and information in the marketplace of ideas. In
the sense of providing objective determinations to the voters, the Or-
ange County Fair Campaign Practices Commission advances this proc-
ess. But to the extent that the ordinance punishes innocent or negligent
misrepresentation, it "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of pub-
lic debate." 1 6 In the sensitive area of election campaigning, where al-
most all candidates have some access to the media for purposes of
rebuttal, the ordinance's impact on public discussion seems a large
price to pay for the benefits of the Commission's determinations.
This price should be fatal to the ordinance. To the extent that Va-
nasco is good precedent, the ordinance is difficult to support. The state
interests advanced by the New York Code and the Orange County or-
dinance are virtually identical. If the interests in accurate information
and voter confidence were insufficient to support fines in New York,
they should not suffice to justify the impact of Commission findings in
Orange County.
But Vanasco notwithstanding, the ordinance does not appear to meet
the requirements of the first amendment. The clear message of New
York Times is that the vigorous debate of public issues requires that
innocent misstatement and negligent falsehood be protected." 7 If the
speaker must be certain of his or her facts, then certain facts may not
become known. The fundamental question regarding publicity sanc-
tions does not concern their character or intent. It concerns their im-
pact. If the findings of the Orange County Fair Campaign Practices
Commission punish unknowing falsehood, then they deter speech that
matters.1 8 Without a malice standard, it would therefore appear that
115. See generally Election Law Developments, supra note 6, at 1285.
116. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
117. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 781-82 (1978).
118. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
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the ordinance cannot withstand first amendment scrutiny.
No doubt it would be awkward for a strictly factfinding commission
like the Orange County body to conduct hearings to determine only
malicious falsity. The problems in ascertaining a candidate's state of
mind in a highly publicized proceeding operating on election timeta-
bles would be almost impossible to manage. But the fact that publicity
sanctions premised on a malice standard may be unworkable does not
improve the constitutional posture of sanctions which do not employ
the standard. If non-malicious falsity is punished, then the ordinance
should fail.
C. Other Problems
The ordinance has two other provisions that merit brief considera-
tion. First, the ordinance imposes two disclosure requirements. Broad-
casts and literature in support of or which "aid in the defeat of any
candidate" must indicate whether or not the contents have been au-
thorized by any candidate."19 All literature and broadcasts, likewise,
must bear the name of at least one person who is responsible for distri-
bution.' 20 While the courts have invalidated broad statutes forbidding
the distribution of all anonymous circulars, 12 1 the courts have upheld
disclosure requirements when the focus is more limited and when they
advance important state interests.1
22
The requirement that broadcasts and literature indicate whether they
have been authorized by a candidate appears a limited intrusion which
need not discourage an individual from presenting a controversial
viewpoint. More far-reaching disclosure requirements relating to cam-
paign contributions have been upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. 1' However, the ordinance's ban on all anonymous literature
likely will fail. A nearly identical requirement in the California Elec-
tions Code was invalidated recently by the California Fourth District
Court of Appeal. 24
Finally, the ordinance requires that persons using another person's
name in support of or in opposition to a candidate or ballot measure
must first obtain written permission from the person whose position is
being represented. 125 In the case of a private citizen, this protection
119. ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., COUNTY ELECTION REGULATIONS, art. 2, §1-7-21.
120. Id. art. 2, §1-7-22.
121. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal.
App. 3d 887, 889, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (1980).
122. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-80 (1976).
123. See id.
124. Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887, 899, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (1980).
125. ORANGE CoUNrY, CAL., COUNTY ELECTION REGULATIONS, art. 2, §1-7-20.
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would be akin to statutes protecting against defamation and would
present few problems.1 26 In the case of a public official or public figure,
however, the provision creates difficulties. Presumably a public official
who has taken a public position on an issue or a candidate, but who no
longer wishes to associate with that position or candidate could prevent
use of his name by refusing written permission. A public figure, who
may be privately working in support of a candidate or measure, could
prevent the advertisement of this fact by again refusing the written per-
mission. In supporting contribution disclosure laws the Court stressed
the public interest in information regarding the associational ties of
public officials. 27 The permission requirement could defeat this inter-
est as well as inhibit the type of discussion about public figures that the
Court addressed in New York Times. Thus, the provision seems to run
afoul of the constitutional doctrines in this area.
CONCLUSION
On a practical level, the Orange County Fair Campaign Practices
Ordinance represents a workable and apparently effective effort to dis-
courage deceptive campaign advertising. On a constitutional level, the
ordinance is an innovative attempt to circumvent the first amendment
problems raised by New York Times and Vanasco. To avoid the malice
requirement, the ordinance changes the character, but not necessarily
the strength, of the sanctions imposed on false speech. But it is the
impact of the sanction rather than the form which should be determi-
native in assessing the chill. If publicity sanctions dampen public dis-
cussion they should meet the same tests that have confronted more
traditional sanctions on deceptive speech.
If the courts determine that publicity sanctions require the applica-
tion of the malice standard, then approaches to the regulation of cam-
paign falsity are likely to be seriously limited. The application of the
malice standard to defamation actions by public figures has severely
diminished the number of actions brought by such parties.128 Existing
statutes imposing criminal sanctions on false campaign speech have
been infrequently enforced 29 and the widespread application of the
malice standard is no doubt one explanation.
Alternatives to criminal sanctions premised on a finding of malice
are not promising. A voluntary code of fair campaigning has been con-
126. See note 77 supra.
127. 424 U.S. at 66-68.
128. C. LAwHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIS 275 (1971).
129. Election Law Developments, supra note 6, at 1280-81 n.269.
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sidered by the California legislature.1 0 Such a code would not appear
to raise problems so long as the provisions do not attempt to limit the
subject matter of campaign appeals.131 But the effectiveness of a volun-
tary approach is subject to question. Private efforts to secure the sub-
scription of candidates to a voluntary code have met with only mixed
success.
132
Another approach might be to preclude pre-election determinations
of falsity. This suggestion, however, does little to advance the public's
interest in accurate information and offers a doubtful deterrent at best.
A politician will prefer not to be labeled as untruthful, no matter when
the label is applied. But the pressures of an election contest may also
encourage a candidate to risk these post-election consequences. In a
hotly contested race, the chances that such a measure would provide a
meaningful deterrent to false speech seem small.
Measures providing for retraction of false statements offer another
approach. But because the retraction approach would require an initial
finding of falsity, it would raise the same constitutional problems as
any other system providing for pre-election determinations. Further
complications would arise from the greater time necessary to find falsi-
ty and issue retractions. Thorny issues of whether or not the retraction
received circulation similar to that of the original misstatement would
likewise create problems.
Considering these alternatives, a statute employing the malice stan-
dard backed by fines may be the only approach capable of working on
both a practical and a constitutional level. Any attempt to avoid the
malice standard by changing the sanctions will spell its own failure. If
130. The Code of Fair Campaign Practices was originally introduced as SB 46, 1977-78 Regu-
lar Session (proposed addition of Chapter 5 to Division 9 of the Elections Code), on December 15,
1976. In its original form, the bill provided for the establishment of local campaign practices
boards within each senatorial district. The local boards would have been unpaid, fact-finding
bodies with no powers of enforcement. This provision was soon removed, leaving the proposal as
a strictly voluntary measure to which each candidate would be asked to subscribe at the time of
filing. For background, see CAMPAIGN L. REp., vol. 3, no. 12, January 1977, at 3; id., vol. 4, no. 2,
March 1977, at 10; SENATE FINAL HISTORY, 1977-78 Regular Session, at 45, 137; SENATE
WEEKLY HISTORY, June 28, 1980, at 203. As SB 988, 1979-80 Regular Session, the proposed code
apparently died in committee. See SENATE WEEKLY HISTORY, Oct. 3, 1980, at 315.
131. The proposed Code of Fair Campaign Practices contained a pledge in which the sub-
scribing candidate lOromised to reject appeals "to prejudice based on race, sex, religion or national
origin". SB 46 1977-78 Regular Session, §1. Similar mandatory proscriptions were invalidated in
Vanasco P. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a discussion of the law relating to this
type of regulation see TRBE, supra note 75, §12-3, at 584-88.
132. The Fair Campaign Practices Committee, a private, nonpartisan group operating in
Washington, D.C., attempts to promote fair campaign practices by seeking candidate subscription
to a fair campaign pledge, investigating complaints regarding dirty political tactics, and promoting
arbitration of campaign disputes. The group was founded in 1954 and offers its services to con-
gressional, gubernatorial, and presidential candidates. In recent years the number of complaints
filed with the committee and the number of disputes going into arbitration has declined. Forty-
two complaints were filed in 1976. See CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Dec. 4, 1976, at 3276-77.
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the sanctions are less effective, then the regulatory scheme may not suc-
cessfully deter deceptive speech. If the sanctions are effective, then they
chill negligent misstatement. Considering the general disuse of cam-
paign falsity statutes that do employ the malice standard, some sort of
adequately staffed enforcement agency would seem essential to any
chance for success. But the larger conclusion of this analysis is that
regulation of falsity in the campaign context lies more in the vigor of
public debate than in the vigilance of government regulation.
Hal alchow
